gianaameri
gian @ gian.ameri.name
You can engineer safety all you want eventually someone will figure out a way to get rid of that safety measure by ways of not paying attention or disengaging whatever safety device was installed.
Sure, but the truth is that the safety measures in rebreathers have not been engineered in the first place (i.e. to the extent required by the current rebreather standard).
Had they been engineered to take into account Human Factors (i.e. to a SIL level of at least one to meet the current rebreather standard), then you could scream at user stupidity.
However, it is not an excuse you have available until after you have taken and demonstrated that the rebreather is at least SIL one or above (i.e. better/less risky).
This fatality - although clearly User Error - was easily preventable by some simple and inexpensive engineering of the machine.
It is not Poseidon's fault at all as it is not possible to anticipate all Human Errors.
However, now that this one has happened, it gives the opportunity to take into account the incident in the context of rebreather design (and training of course and other procedural issues) and make it better/safer.
System, procedures, and controls are not written in stone. They are man-made, prone to Human Error, and man can improve on them by adopting CHANGE.
Last edited: