GLOC
real name: Gareth Lock!
The report from the CCR fatality 2 years ago was recently heard and an excellent Coroner's report has been released. I can't find the original discussion thread on here but there was significant negative criticism over how could someone dive with cells 40 months old (cells 1 & 3) and 17 months old (cell 2). Similar discussions followed the fatality last year in the UK following the inquest 2 months ago where current limited cells were a contributory factor; it is a shame we don't get reports like this in the public domain.
As with any incident, it wasn't just technical issues at play (current limited cells, voting logic) but also a number of human factors involved.
The Coroner's report covers confirmation bias and anchoring as key human factors. I also think there was likely alarm blindness, maybe external pressures due to an inability to source reliable cells and the need to continue teaching, normalisation of deviance, inattention and/or selective attention blindness. I cover confirmation bias in some of the training I deliver have written about it here on my Cognitas blog.
Just because something didn't go wrong the last time a 'sub-optimal' decision is made, it doesn't mean the next time it won't go wrong. Forecasting the future based on past performance isn't a necessarily a great thing to practice when it comes to life support.
Diving has a level of risk which we can control and mitigate to a certain extent, as long as we are informed of the factors out there. I believe that reports like this are great because they go into significant detail identifying a number of non-technical factors at play. I also believe that when divers submit 'non-fatal' incident reports, they should consider go into a level which would allow someone unconnected to the incident to read it and determine what happened and why. Importantly, it isn't enough to know what happened, to improve we need to know why the diver made those decisions so that we are better prepared.
Regards
As with any incident, it wasn't just technical issues at play (current limited cells, voting logic) but also a number of human factors involved.
The Coroner's report covers confirmation bias and anchoring as key human factors. I also think there was likely alarm blindness, maybe external pressures due to an inability to source reliable cells and the need to continue teaching, normalisation of deviance, inattention and/or selective attention blindness. I cover confirmation bias in some of the training I deliver have written about it here on my Cognitas blog.
Just because something didn't go wrong the last time a 'sub-optimal' decision is made, it doesn't mean the next time it won't go wrong. Forecasting the future based on past performance isn't a necessarily a great thing to practice when it comes to life support.
Diving has a level of risk which we can control and mitigate to a certain extent, as long as we are informed of the factors out there. I believe that reports like this are great because they go into significant detail identifying a number of non-technical factors at play. I also believe that when divers submit 'non-fatal' incident reports, they should consider go into a level which would allow someone unconnected to the incident to read it and determine what happened and why. Importantly, it isn't enough to know what happened, to improve we need to know why the diver made those decisions so that we are better prepared.
Regards